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Polygamy and the Predicament of Contemporary Criminal Law
Benjamin L. Berger*

This chapter takes a step back from the substantive debate of whether polygamy
ought to be prohibited by the criminal law, asking instead what the debate on this issue
discloses about the predicament of contemporary criminal law itself. There is much of
interest to be said in a sociological vein about the lives of those in polygamous family
units, observations that may have normative implications for the criminal law.1 There are
also many jurisprudential questions with which advocates and the courts will have to
engage to decide the practical question of the constitutionality of a criminal law
proscribing polygamy, including the limits of freedom of religion and the reach and
interpretation of equality protections; and there is no dearth of writing identifying,
examining, and sometimes staking out positions on those issues.2 Much of the scholarly
conversation revolves around identifying hypocrisies and unexamined assumptions in the
criminalization of polygamy3 or debating harms that inhere in the practise of polygamy.4
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This paper will focus, instead, on the unacknowledged role that the debate about
polygamy has had in exposing a crucial fault line within the structure of contemporary
criminal law itself.
This piece is propelled by two observations about the current debate regarding the
constitutionality of the prohibition of polygamy in Canada’s Criminal Code.5 The first
and most important is of the tremendous and disproportionate degree of anxiety that
surrounds the debate over the polygamy prohibition in Canada. Section 293 of the
Criminal Code has lain substantially fallow in its long life in Canadian criminal law,
producing precious few prosecutions.6 Similarly, the evidence suggests that the practice
of polygamy is still a marginal phenomenon. The community that has been at the centre
of the debate in recent years, the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints (FLDS) community in
Bountiful, British Columbia, is a small group that, despite the criminal prohibition, has
carried on its polygamous ways for decades with a wink and a nod from officials and
from the small number of Canadians aware of the community’s existence. Yet now that
the issue has been reactivated by a zealous Attorney General in British Columbia,7 the
issue of the criminalization of polygamy has stirred a storm of public and academic
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See, e.g., Bala, supra note 2; Stephen A. Kent, "A Matter of Principle: Fundamentalist Mormon
Polygamy, Children, and Human Rights Debates" (2006) 10:1 Nova Religio 7; Lori G. Beaman,
"Response: Who Decides? Harm, Polygamy and Limits on Freedom" (2006) 10:1 Nova Religio 43.
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RSC 1985, c C-46, s 293.
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Bala, supra note 2 at 183, cites only two reported convictions for polygamy, both at the turn of the 20th
century and both involving an Aboriginal accused. For a brief history of s. 293 of the Criminal Code, see
Berger, “Moral Judgment,” supra note 2 at 544.
7
In 2007 then-Attorney General Wally Oppal began a process of serially asking special prosecutors or
appointed Crown Counsel to evaluate whether charges of polygamy ought to be laid against leaders in
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debate, much of it characterized by a sense of enormous stakes and a high degree of
anxiety.
A second curious feature of the debate concerns who it is that one finds defending
the criminal prohibition against polygamy. Amongst those supporting the law are two
odd compatriots. On the one hand, one finds moral conservatives defending the use of
the criminal law in this situation. Although the feminist debate on the issue is
characteristically complex and positions divided,8 one also finds, on the other hand, that
another powerful set of those defending prohibitions on polygamy do so from a
foundation based in a strong line of feminist legal argument.9 The distance between the
substantive views that energize these two sets of commentators makes the convergence of
their arguments and efforts on this issue somewhat perplexing. Is this a mere coincidence
or is there some principled connection between these two camps on the issue of the
criminalization of polygamy? One might call this second observation the “strange
bedfellows” puzzle.
The argument of this chapter is that polygamy has emerged as an issue with a
particular capacity to expose a certain vulnerability at the heart of contemporary criminal
law. Specifically, the debate over the constitutionality of the criminal prohibition on
polygamy points to a metaphysical shortfall that afflicts contemporary criminal law. This
“shortfall” or gap is not something to be patched or remediated; it is, rather, at the heart
of the predicament of criminal law under the liberal culture of the constitutional rule of
8

See, e.g., Michèle Alexandre, "Big Love: Is Feminist Polygamy an Oxymoron or a True Possibility"
(2007) 18 Hastings Women's L.J. 3; Joan Iversen, "Feminist Implications of Mormon Polygyny" (1984)
10:3 Feminist Studies 505.
9
See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1999); Beverley Baines, "Equality's Nemesis?" (2006) 5 JL & Equality 57. One account of a feminist
argument against polygyny is given in Rebecca J. Cook and Lisa M. Kelly, Polygyny and Canada’s
Obligations Under International Human Rights Law, prepared for the Department of Justice Canada
(Ottawa: Family, Children and Youth Section, 2006), part II(a).
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law. If true, the nature of this vulnerability offers an answer to why polygamy has bred
such anxiety and may also offer some insight into the awkward consortium of defenders
of the criminal prohibition.

Ethics, Metaphysics, and the Criminal Law
Clifford Geertz begins his celebrated essay on the interpretive anthropological
approach to understanding religion with a crucial lesson. Pushing back on certain
instincts in the study of religion, Geertz admonishes that “[r]eligion is never merely
metaphysics.”10 “The holy,” he explains, “bears within it everywhere a sense of intrinsic
obligation: it not only encourages devotion, it demands it; it not only induces intellectual
assent, it enforces emotional commitment.”11 Geertz is arguing that religion cannot be
understood simply as a set of beliefs about the way the world is. Beliefs impel certain
norms of conduct: “that which is set apart as more than mundane is inevitably considered
to have far-reaching implications for the direction of human conduct.”12 Yet the inverse
is equally true, and this point is crucial to this chapter:
Never merely metaphysics, religion is never merely ethics either. The
source of its moral vitality is conceived to lie in the fidelity with which it
expresses the fundamental nature of reality. The powerfully coercive
‘ought’ is felt to grow out of a comprehensive factual ‘is,’ and in such a
way religion grounds the most specific requirements of human action in
the most general contexts of human existence.13
For the purpose of the study of religion, Geertz goes on to translate this connection
between ethics and metaphysics into a parallel pairing of ethos and worldview. Religion
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Clifford Geertz, "Ethos, World View, and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols" in The Interpretation of
Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 126 at 126.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
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is not a set of normative rules or prescriptions for conduct (ethics/ethos) distinct from a
set of beliefs about the way the world is (metaphysics/worldview). Nor can the
worldview dimensions of religion be severed from the ethos that it arouses and vitalizes.
For Geertz, the two sides of this equation mutually support (in his terms, “confirm”) one
another. Consider his explanation:
[T]he ethos is made intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent
a way of life implied by the actual state of affairs which the world view
describes, and the world view is made emotionally acceptable by being
presented as an image of an actual state of affairs of which such a way of
life is an authentic expression.14
Geertz insists that this mutually supportive relationship between ethics and metaphysics
is the key to understanding religion as a cultural system. This ineluctable union between
ethics (ethos) and metaphysics (worldview) is a structural truth that, he asserts,
characterizes all religions: “This demonstration of a meaningful relation between the
values a people holds and the general order of existence within which it finds itself is an
essential element in all religions, however those values or that order be conceived.”15
Geertz posits this structural relationship between ethics and metaphysics – the mutual
reliance of the “ought” and the “is” for a coherent culture – in the context of a discussion
of religion. Yet religion is, for Geertz, simply one manifestation of a broader conceptual
category, that of “cultural system.”
The contemporary rule of law is also a cultural system.16 Much of my work has
explored the insights that can be gained about the nature of modern constitutionalism, and
14

Ibid at 127.
Ibid.
16
See Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1999); Paul W. Kahn, Putting Liberalism in its Place (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005). Geertz would seem to concur with this understanding of law. See Clifford Geertz,
"Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective" in Local Knowledge: Further Essays in
Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983) 167.
15
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in particular its relationship with religion, by taking seriously its cultural nature.17 Law,
too, is a set of symbols and meanings, combined with a set of practices and rituals, that
helps to make sense of and orient oneself within the world. If there is truth in this claim,
then one must grapple with the relevance of Geertz’s key point about the interrelationship
between ethics and metaphysics necessary to sustain a culture for the understanding of
law. In so doing, the criminal law occupies a special position inasmuch as it represents
the most insistent and violent expression of an ethical system within the legal order.
Within the culture of law’s rule, criminal law is ethos writ large. The “ought” expressed
in the criminal law is supported by the liberty-suspending violence of the state and
represents the sharp edge of the legal relationship between community and individual;18 it
is, indeed, a “powerfully coercive ought”. The interesting but generally unexamined
question for a cultural understanding of the criminal law begins to come into focus. Does
there exist an “is” that supports this “ought”? Does an ethical system of criminal law not
also depend on a mutually supportive relationship with metaphysics? Geertz argues that
the metaphysical or ontological is necessary to make the ethical “intellectually
reasonable” and it does so by justifying the ethical demand in a claim about the way that
the world is. An ethical demand bereft of some such grounding in a claim about the way
things are appears to us as simply “arbitrary” and the rule of law has an antipathy towards
the arbitrary. This is one way of understanding Berman’s claim that “[e]very legal
system shares with religion certain elements – ritual, tradition, authority, and universality
17

See, e.g., Benjamin L. Berger, "Law's Religion: Rendering Culture" (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 277;
Benjamin L. Berger, "The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance" (2008) 21:2 Can. J. L. & Jur. 245.
18
As Reginald Allen wrote in Reginald Allen, "The Trial of Socrates: A Study in the Morality of the
Criminal Process" in Martin L. Friedland ed., Courts and Trials: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1975) 3 at 4, “[i]t is in the criminal process that law and government most
narrowly touch, beneficently and also dangerously, the lives of the governed. And it is here that instinct
and passion beat hardest on rationality and restraint.”
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– which are needed to symbolize and educate men’s legal emotions. Otherwise law
degenerates into legalism.”19 There would appear to be no reason to imagine that the
criminal law is uniquely exempt from Geertz’s structural observation about the
relationship between ethics and metaphysics.
It might appear odd – or a philosophical indulgence – to posit the need for an
ontological backing to the criminal law. Our debates about the criminal law rarely seem
to turn on or even engage metaphysical questions. Yet I would argue that this rarity is
simply the product of the fact that most criminal prohibitions rely upon ontologies that
are either not substantially contested or are the subject of such extensive overlap among
different ontologies that the metaphysical questions are not exposed. There might be
significant difference, for example, on the metaphysical shape and stakes of the
prohibition on murder, but the degree of consensus on the ethical result occludes the fact
of these differences in worldview. It tends to be in matters of “morals legislation” that
serious contestation of ontological issues takes place; indeed, it might be plausible to
define “morals legislation” in the criminal law as none other than those instances in
which the law’s coherence most clearly turns on the existence of a claim or position on
metaphysical or ontological questions. And with this reference to morals legislation one
sees that, in fact, criminal law theory has been more attentive to this problem of the
relationship between ethics and metaphysics than we might normally acknowledge – the
issue is right under the noses of those concerned with the criminal law.
The Hart-Devlin debate about morals legislation can be productively understood
as a debate about this link between ethics and metaphysics. Devlin’s position that the

19

Harold Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion (Nashville and New York: Abingdon Press, 1974)
at 49.
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criminal law is justified in prohibiting conduct if it is supported by the views of the “man
on the Clapham omnibus” is really the assertion that the ethics of criminal law demand
support from a worldview or ontology and that the adequate source of that backing can be
found in a certain degree of societal consensus.20 Hart’s reply is not to deny the need for
this link between ethics and metaphysics to ground justifiable criminal law; rather – and
this brings us closer to the rub – his answer is essentially that the only acceptable
ontological foundation for a liberal criminal law is harm, unacceptable as it is for the
liberal rule of law in a plural society to wade into and take positions on other
metaphysical debates.21
The fly in the ointment regarding this link between ethics and metaphysics in the
criminal law is the political culture of liberalism. If a metaphysical question at the root of
a criminal law is exposed, the liberal culture of law’s rule arguably lacks the resources
and most certainly lacks the appetite to answer.22 To take a position on a fraught
question of worldview is antithetical to the self-understanding of the liberal rule of law.
It may indeed be that a good deal of freedom is to be found in a political culture that is
committed to this kind of self-understanding. But without necessarily denying the
salutary effects of such a posture, if one carries forward the ideas developed in Geertz’s
20

See Patrick Devlin, "Morals and the Criminal Law" in The Enforcement of Morals (London, Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 1965) 1.
21
See H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); H. L. A. Hart,
"Immorality and Treason" in Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., Morality and the Law (Belmont, Cal.:
Wadsworth Publishing, 1971) 48. For an interesting critique of Hart’s positivism, see Stephen Wexler,
"The Moral Confusions in Positivism, Utilitarianism and Liberalism" (1985) 30 Am J Juris 121. The heart
of Wexler’s analysis is well explained at page 123: “Law is a special sort of enterprise and the positivist
distinction between law and morals, far from helping us to understand that enterprise, forces us to miss one
of the most characteristic things about it: namely, that the people who engage in it believe they are engaged
in a moral enterprise. This is not just a psychological point; it is a conceptual point. In order to be doing
what we would call ‘law,’ a judge has to believe (or more properly, convince us that he believes) that he is
engaged in a moral enterprise.”
22
Drawing from Wendy Brown’s work, I refer elsewhere to law’s commitment to its own neutrality as the
“conceit” of law’s autonomy from culture. See Berger, “Cultural Limits”, supra note 17. See also Kahn,
Putting Liberalism in its Place, supra note 16.
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thought, an ethics with an unanswered metaphysics lacks a necessary coherence. Viewed
in this way, there is a certain political danger surrounding criminal law in the
contemporary culture of law’s rule. It may be that coherent support for certain criminal
laws demands the taking of an ontological stance, something that criminal law in a
cultural of political liberalism cannot or will not do. To raise the question of the
constitutionality – the normative justifiability in a legal order – of a criminal law
dependant on such contested metaphysical foundations exposes a certain fragility in our
ethical order, an order in which the criminal law has played an essential role.
In English Speaking Justice, George Grant calls this fragility “the terrifying
darkness which has fallen upon modern justice.”23 And in his inimitably challenging
way, George Grant offers a sterling and provocative example of the dynamic that I am
describing. In his famous analysis of the decision in Roe v. Wade,24 Grant concludes that
the case “raise[d] a cup of poison to the lips of liberalism.”25 “The poison,” Grant
explains, “is presented in the unthought ontology. In negating the right to existence for
foetuses of less than six months, the judge has to say what foetuses are not.”26 To
adjudicate on the issue of abortion raised questions for which “contractual liberalism”
does not have the resources to answer. In addressing the issue of abortion, with its
central and unavoidable question of the ontological status of the foetus, Grant concludes
that “[t]he judge unwittingly looses the terrible question: has the long tradition of liberal
right any support in what human beings in fact are? Is this a question that in the modern
era can be truthfully answered in the positive? Or does it hand the cup of poison to our

23

George Grant, English-Speaking Justice (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1998 [1974]) at 86.
410 US 113 (1973).
25
Grant, supra note 23 at 71.
26
Ibid. at 71.
24
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liberalism?”27 Despite the enormous conceptual and political differences between the
two thinkers, Geertz and Grant are on the same page here in their insistence on the
cultural demand for a metaphysics that can make our ethics feel “intellectually
reasonable.” We are not often met with this fraught dynamic in the criminal law. Grant,
again, provides evocative assistance as to why these matters tend to stay out of our
view… and when they show themselves:
The need to justify modern liberal justice has been kept in the wings of our
English-speaking drama by our power and the strength of our tradition. In
such events as the decision on abortion it begins to walk upon the stage.28
The argument of this chapter is that the anxiety apparent in debates about polygamy can
be traced to the fact that the criminalization of polygamy is another such question that
gives this troubling justificatory demand its cue.
How Polygamy Raises the Ontological Question
This chapter is ultimately interested in what debates about the crime of polygamy
disclose about the modern predicament of the criminal law. Drawing inspiration from
Geertz and Grant, I have been exploring the idea that there is a necessary link between
ethics and metaphysics, between rule and worldview, that is infrequently examined in our
criminal law but structurally indispensible. Polygamy gives us a valuable line of sight
into this foundational link because it places contested questions of ontology or
metaphysics on the table in an atmosphere inhospitable and even hostile to such questions
and without the inclination or resources to answer them. But in what way does polygamy
put questions of ontology in the criminal law squarely before us?

27
28

Ibid. at 71-72.
Ibid. at 73.
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One obvious form of answer would be to jump directly to the observation that in
the debate over the constitutional status of polygamy one finds competing viewpoints
expressed by religious communities. These religions hold complete and thick
metaphysical positions that lead them to differ on the ethical status of polygamy. By way
of example, one might gesture easily to the obvious chasm between the commitments
arising from the religious beliefs of the FLDS, on the one hand, and those of the Roman
Catholic Church, on the other. Though evident, this is too ready an answer – one that is
both under-reflective of the scope of the problem with which I am concerned and
insufficiently precise. Of interest here is that the debate over polygamy is not just a
question of a clash between religious worldviews or between a metaphysically pregnant
set of religious views and a comparatively arid secular understanding of criminalization.
Gesturing easily to religion or religious difference simply does not capture the scope of
the anxiety surrounding the issue of polygamy and it carves off the (sometimes
emphatically) non-religious perspectives with considerable ontological investments in the
polygamy debate. The deep contours of the polygamy issue in the criminal law are not
centrally about religious difference.
If not explicable as a simple matter of a clash between a secular criminal law and
religious perspectives, or a duel among religions for capture of the criminal law, what
ontological questions – what questions about the “is” – does the criminalization of
polygamy activate? I will point to two such questions, the answers to which carry
substantial stakes for contemporary society.
(a) Marriage and the Family

11

First, and perhaps most obviously, the debate over polygamy puts on the table the
metaphysical status of marriage and the family. The existence of a criminal law
prohibiting polygamy is, for many involved in the debate, implicated in a project of
protecting a conception of “the family.”29 One can find expression of this view wherever
one finds arguments supporting the criminalization of polygamy on the basis that it is not
a “normal” or “natural” expression of family life. Packed into such arguments is a claim
that there is, in fact, an ontologically identifiable and definable shape of a family and that
the state has a legitimate interest in deploying the powerfully coercive “ought” of the
criminal law in protection and preservation of this unit of social structure. In its most
traditional expression, of course, this metaphysical family that the law has a role in
preserving is the heterosexual nuclear family, with monogamous marriage serving as the
foundational relationship that sustains and replicates this structure.
To claim that the legal status of marriage and the family raises ontological
concerns for the law may not be intuitive. Yet legal history supports the view that
marriage was not conceived of as a creation of the law but, rather, as a natural concept
that served as a foundation for political, social and legal structures. Otherwise put,
metaphysical commitments about the family not only precede the legal but have
implications for the legal and political. This is the relationship between worldview and
ethos posited by Geertz. The shape and even content of the legal is made comprehensible
and acceptable by its congruence with worldview. Mark Walters explains that common
and civil-law legal thinkers like Blackstone and Pufendorf understood the relationship

29

For discussions of the role of Christianity in influencing modern conceptions of marriage and the family
in Canada, see Robert Leckey, "Profane Matrimony" (2006) 21:2 CJLS 1; Sarah Carter, The Importance of
Being Monogamous: Marriage and Nation Building in Western Canada to 1915 (Edmonton: University of
Alberta Press, 2008).
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between husband and wife as “founded in nature”,30 one way of stating that this
relationship formed part of an assumed ontology. For these foundational thinkers,
“marriage was originally a pre-political, or natural, state in which men and women united
for the purpose of having and raising children.”31 Marriage and the family of the
historically normative form had a factual status with implications for the social and
political order, an ontological reality marked by its status as part of the “natural law” that
had ethical implications for human law and political society. Matrimony “furnishes, as it
were, the material for the establishment of governments and states”.32
In his book, The Police Power,33 Markus Dubber offers a provocative example of
this influence of a vision of the family and familial authority on modern legal
governance. In Dubber’s analysis, the household and the patriarchal authority of the
father serves as the ontological model for the exercise of the central power of government
– the police power – which, as a “mode, or mentality, of governance spread across the
entirety of criminal law.”34 There is perhaps no better example of the manner in which
the “is” implies an “ought” in the fabric of our legal history. Blackstone himself made
this link, speaking at one point about the common law governing offences against the
state as concerned with
the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the
individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are
bound to confirm their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good

30

Mark D. Walters, "Incorporating Common Law into the Constitution of Canada: EGALE v. Canada and
the Status of Marriage" (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall LJ 75 at 90, quoting Blackstone.
31
Ibid at 94.
32
Ibid at 95, quoting Pufendorf.
33
Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
34
Ibid at 171.
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neighbourhood, and good manners: and to be decent, industrious, and
inoffensive in their respective stations.35
In Dubber’s analysis, the historical influence of the ontology of the household was
sufficiently central and potent to generate a robust political and legal ethos, chiefly
through the conditioning of the police power, upon which the criminal law is based.
Yet the ontology of the family has undergone stress, testing, and deep questioning
in recent years. As Gillian Calder explains, “Canadians find themselves at a unique
historical moment where consciousness about the way that law defines family, and
particularly marriage, is heightened.”36 There is, of course, a social and legal coming to
terms with the fact of divorce and the consequent impacts on the shape of the family. To
some extent these changes have been absorbed into a margin of appreciation around the
nuclear heterosexual family, an absorption that may even serve to shore up the
foundational commitment. But the pressures on any stable definition of the family as a
metaphysical concept have mounted from a number of sources, not least of which is the
legal recognition of same-sex marriage.37 The debate around same sex marriage was in
many ways a debate about the ontological status of the family. Would the law adopt the
view that marriage is between a man and a woman? Would it denounce any pre-legal
conception of marriage and the family? Ultimately, Parliament and the Courts did the
liberally predictable thing; in contrast to its historical roots, it refused to endorse a notion
of the family embedded in a given worldview; and without that metaphysical

35

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4 (1769) at 162. Cited in Dubber,
supra note 33 at xii.
36
Gillian Calder, "Penguins and Polyamory: Using Law and Film to Explore the Essence of Marriage in
Canadian Family Law" (2009) 21 C.J.W.L. 55 at 72.
37
See Drummond, supra note 3 at 323-324, in which she describes these pressures on changes to the
traditional family form and concludes that “the contemporary range of sexual and familial diversity
deprives functional conjugality of the bright-line coherence that it might have once had in an era where the
range of ‘normal’ families was quite narrow.”
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commitment, there was ultimately no backing for an exclusionary norm of marriage. To
be sure, the law sought to leave space for multiple conceptions of marriage to flourish.38
Yet if we take as inalienable the dialectic between metaphysics and ethics, one can easily
see why those committed to a particular pre-legal, pre-political understanding of marriage
took this shift as an ontological defeat – a rejection of their metaphysics.
Any pre-political definition of the family would be suspect in a liberally dedicated
criminal law, which ought not to assume any position on the ontological status of the
family or of marriage. To do so is to wade into the messy world of metaphysics – the
liberally poisonous atmosphere of comprehensive doctrines. No position should be taken
on the “is” of the family form, yet the crime of polygamy puts us face to face with a
remnant of the traditional ontology of the family – monogamy.39 The crime of polygamy
thus opens up a point of ontological uncertainty – is there an assumed sense of the family
that the crime of polygamy protects? Debate over polygamy becomes an occasion to
once again take up arms over questions of metaphysics. This is one way in which
polygamy puts the ontological question on the table for the criminal law and does so in a
provocatively unique manner. Compare the crime of polygamy to the crimes of assault,
theft, or murder. There may be strong differences amongst various worldviews on why
each of these acts is wrong, positions backed by radically different metaphysics. Yet the
object of criminal protection – the body, property – is not itself ontologically uncertain.
Polygamy presents a very different dilemma. In a real, unique, and provocative way, at
stake in debates about the crime of polygamy is the ontological status of marriage and the

38

Reference re: Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.
For an interesting discussion of the relationship between conceptions of monogamy and reactions to
polygamy, see Elizabeth F. Emens, "Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence" (2004) 29 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 277.
39
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family. If the family is a structure based on monogamous union, a crime of polygamy
makes a certain sense;40 if this ontology is false, the crime loses coherence. But this is a
question that can’t be answered without going off-side in the liberal game, particularly
when the coercive force of the state will align itself behind the answer; and consider what
an inability or unwillingness to answer means for the criminal law – a gap in the account
of why this powerfully coercive ethics is intelligible and acceptable: a worrisome crack in
the justificatory eggshell.
(b)

The Nature of Harm

A reader will immediately observe that a claim about the protection of a “natural”
family form is not the only basis for a justification or defence of the crime of polygamy.
Independent of or agnostic to any claims about a natural or essential family form, one
might say that polygamy creates certain social harms, harms that justify the
criminalization of polygamy. When it isn’t about the nature of the family unity, much of
the debate on polygamy is about just this point: does polygamy produce harms that justify
the deployment of the force of the criminal law? Measured against metaphysical claims
about the nature of the family, the appeal of a debate cast in terms of harm is apparent.
Reaching back to Mill, the language of “harm” has seemed to offer peaceful ontological
ground on which to discuss claims about the use of the coercive force of the state. Yet, as
I will explain, this promise has proved misleading in other issues involving contested
notions of harm.41 On close inspection, claims about the harms of polygamy depend on
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controversial claims regarding the “is” no less than arguments based on defence of
marriage or the family form.
To satisfyingly underwrite this particular criminal prohibition, these identified
harms cannot be ones addressed by other crimes such as child abuse or sexual
interference with a minor. To adequately fuel the ethic, one must find a harm occasioned
by polygamy itself; and my claim is that the pursuit of such a harm is, in its nature, a
matter of worldview and ontology. In most areas of the criminal law, questions of harm
pose few metaphysical questions. The harm of stabbing another involves no elements
whose factual status are at issue. The existence or reality of something called physical
harm or property damage is never seriously contested. But the nature of morals
legislation involves an inherent opaqueness or contestability with respect to whether a
certain kind of harm can be said to exist. This opaqueness around questions of harm is at
the heart of foundational debates on the limits of the criminal law, again as evidenced in
the Hart-Devlin debate.42 In contrast to Hart, who was wary of the potential for tyranny
implicit in such claims and insisted on the narrower and more traditional liberal definition
of harm as involving concrete harm to others,43 Devlin imagined that there was a
category of things called “harm to society” or “harms to community” that could buoy the
criminal law.44 Those who seek to identify the unique harm of polygamy point to
communicative harm or social harm of a different variety. Polygamy, this argument
holds, involves an intrinsic communicative harm regarding the dignity and equality of
women. Independent of concrete physical harms, polygamy (chiefly practiced as
polygyny) visits a social harm by supporting a view of women as subservient to men and
42
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unequal in their political and social status.45 The claim is that polygamy thus creates a
real harm in the world, a harm that, once recognized as real, supports or even demands
remedy through the criminal law. Once again one sees the reciprocal relationship
between ethics and ontology.
The acceptance of this kind of claim regarding the communicative and social
harms of pornography was the great victory of a particular feminist argument in R. v.
Butler,46 in which the Supreme Court of Canada accepted that pornography and obscenity
might gave rise to social harm of a form cognizable by the criminal law. Independent of
any concrete physical harm, obscenity could create attitudinal harm inconsistent with the
proper functioning of society. In so holding, the Court followed the structure of
reasoning urged by a feminist perspective best reflected in the work of Catharine
MacKinnon.47 I am suggesting that this was, at base, an ontological victory. It was the
legal recognition as real something whose metaphysical status was deeply contested – a
certain form of harm.
In recent years, the harm principle has become the lodestar for discussion about
the proper limits of the criminal law. The question of the legalization of marijuana was
debated and ultimately decided on the basis of whether it causes harm.48 The harm
principle has dethroned the older “community standards of tolerance” test in matters of
criminal obscenity and indecency.49 But the harm principle is ultimately vacuous and
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debate about it decides little of interest. As Bernard Harcourt has convincingly argued,
what “counts” as harm depends upon one’s normative perspective.50 Debates cast in the
idiom of harm attempt to hold off normative and interpretive questions by burying them
under the second-order issue of what “counts” as a harm.51 One might therefore call
debates about harm a form of “proxy debate”: a form of legal discourse apparently
sanitized of the fraught reality of cultural and normative difference. Such debates are
stand-ins for normative debates that employ the language of harm because of its
acceptability within liberal political culture, as contrasted with the inadmissibility of
debates about fundamental values. But perhaps it is more accurate or precise to say that
they are proxy debates because they stand in for debates about worldview, about ontology
and metaphysics. What one regards as a real harm is a metaphysical question embedded,
to evoke Geertz’s language, in the web of a larger worldview.52
When one argues from a perspective committed to the existence of the
communicative, inegalitarian, and anti-social harms of polygamy, one is taking a
fundamentally ontological position. This ontological position-taking is no different in
kind than the sort never much interrogated (for obvious reasons) in the case of the
physical harms of murder or the psychological harms of stalking. The difference lies in
the extent to which we see how deeply worldview is at play when the harms of polygamy
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are on the table. When the non-physical harms of polygamy are invoked in defence of
the constitutionality of the offence, a position is being staked out on the ontological status
of the social, of social harm, and the necessary implications for the criminal law. And
here one finds the point of joining between the two essentially ontological questions that I
suggest are placed in the light of day by the crime of polygamy. Whether founded on
claims about non-physical harm or claims about the natural concept of the family,
arguments about the ethical/legal status of the crime of polygamy can’t help but engage
us in deeply contested and fundamental questions about what “is”. Polygamy thus
exposes the criminal law as an ontological battleground with the real prospect of winners
and losers. Just like invocations of the natural family, claims about the social harms of
polygamy expose the prospect of an unanswered demand for ontological clarity to
validate the powerfully coercive ethics of the criminal law. Quite uncomfortably within
liberal political culture, the stakes of an argument about the harms of polygamy, and with
this the constitutionality of the offence of polygamy, turn out to have an abiding
metaphysical dimension.

The Polygamy Debate and the Structure of Criminal Law
At the outset of this chapter I identified two observations about the current debate
regarding the constitutionality of the crime of polygamy. I suggested that these features
of the debate called for some explanation. The first was the disproportionate anxiety that
seems to have coalesced around the question of polygamy. Why, given its relative
marginality as a social ill, has the status of the offence of polygamy drawn so much
anxious debate? The second curious feature of the debate was what I called the “strange
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bedfellows” problem. Lining up in support of the offence of polygamy one finds both a
constellation of moral conservatives and a particular band of those on the left informed
by one influential line of feminist legal argument. What accounts for this unlikely and no
doubt uncomfortable coalition in defence of the crime of polygamy?
Focussing in on the relationship between ethics and metaphysics – and isolating
the particular way in which the issue of polygamy gives the cue to ontological questions
to walk upon the stage of political and legal debates – suggests certain answers to both of
these questions.
The deep anxiety palpable around the constitutionality of the polygamy offence
ceases to be quite so mysterious. At stake for those engaged in the polygamy debate is no
less than the collective acceptance of certain basic ontological commitments. The extent
to which metaphysical assumptions matter to the coherence of law is frequently – even
generally – hidden by a substantial degree of overlapping consensus on the ultimate
ethical principle. This ethical agreement masks the diversity, disparity, and even conflict
among the various worldviews that are increasingly a feature of our deeply pluralistic
society. The anxiety generated by the polygamy debate may be partly generated by the
issue’s capacity to expose the degree of ontological uncertainty that exists behind
contemporary law. Given the sharp way in which polygamy lays bare certain
fundamental but contested assumptions about the order of things, the issue serves as an
occasion for us to wonder about the extent of our consensus on essential ontological
questions and to ask what degree of such consensus is necessary to bind us as together as
a community – or at least what degree is necessary to have a legal system that is more
than the formalism of an ethics without a metaphysics. If Grant is correct that liberal
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political culture has lost the resources necessary to answer the very ontological questions
that it poses, the result of this reflection may well be unsettling. Of course, the anxiety is
compounded for those with a vested interest in a particular ontological claim engaged by
polygamy, be it a claim about the “is” of the family or of social harm. For them the
stakes may seem particularly high – the possible rejection of their metaphysical
assumptions. And with this one also finds a solution to the strange bedfellows puzzle.
Despite widely divergent or even competing normative or political visions that make for
very different accounts of how they arrived there, those for whom the crime of polygamy
is the natural expression of an ontological truth will find themselves standing, if
awkwardly, shoulder to shoulder. Viewed in this light, finding communitarians of a
certain orientation lined up on the same side of the polygamy issues as religious and
moral conservatives seems utterly unremarkable.
Yet the ultimate goal of this chapter has been to explore what polygamy may
disclose to us about the modern predicament of criminal law.
The criminal law that we have inherited is the child of the 19th century, a time in
which those with settled and sometime fierce metaphysical convictions wielded the
criminal law in unabashed support of their worldviews. In this era the criminal law took
on a capacious moral role in society. And although we now inhabit a political culture of
liberalism in which the conceit of metaphysical agnosticism is essential to law’s selfunderstanding,53 our criminal law is simply not cut from the same cloth. Contemporary
debates about polygamy reveal the extent to which we have an illiberal criminal law in
53
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the midst of a political culture of liberalism. One need only flip open the Criminal Code,
our somewhat updated late 19th century expression of ethics, to find offences that would
sit comfortably in a late Victorian British elite context of largely shared basic
metaphysics. Today, however, those offences – of which polygamy is no doubt one –
present deep conceptual quandaries for governance in an ontologically diverse society.
Let me be clear in my view that there is great freedom to be won in the release
from collective ontologies enforced by the state. There is a real good here, particularly in
deeply plural societies. But as a theoretical question about criminal law as a mode of
governance, release from these kinds of shared metaphysics poses certain very thorny
problems. If there is any wisdom in what Geertz says about the nature of culture, if there
is any truth in Grant’s observations about the troubling state of a justice system that lacks
the resources to answer the ontological questions that it itself poses, then is modern
criminal law facing the predicament of attempting to be an ethics without a metaphysics?
In effect, the ethical question – should polygamy be criminally prohibited? – serves as an
access point into an ontological uncertainty that afflicts modern criminal law generally,
posing a question that I’m not certain we have yet squarely asked and we have certainly
not answered: what becomes of the limits of the criminal law as our sense of a shared
ontology thins?

Conclusion: The Predicament of Modern Criminal Law
Debates about the offence of polygamy can thus serve as a valuable window into
something important about the contemporary condition of criminal law. There is a
metaphysical gap at its base, an ontological uncertainty under which it secretly labours.
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When consensus on its ethical imperatives wavers and they are pushed back to look for
the grounding in an ontology or worldview, there appears an abiding uncertainty, one that
the political culture of liberalism in which the criminal law is embedded is
philosophically averse to resolving. The criminal law shows an understandable
timorousness about assertions of the “general order of existence”, assertions that Geertz
nevertheless posits as essential to the coherence of the powerfully coercive “ought”.
There is much of interest to explore about the history, the social location, and the ethical
status of polygamy. When understood in the terms that I have suggested, the very
richness of this debate – the extent to which it engages a range of positions on ontological
questions – gestures to a general fragility that sits behind the swaggering and phlegmatic
exterior of the criminal law.
If one were to take this structural insight to heart, it would seem that two
possibilities present for the criminal law at points of ontological uncertainty. One is to
embrace the need for the law to make the kinds of claims that can make its ethics
“intellectually reasonable”. This approach would affirm the powerfully communicative
function of the criminal law as central to its modern social role. To do so would mean
breaking from the conceits of modern legal liberalism and embracing a certain role of the
criminal law in staking out and expressing ontological positions. The other response to
this metaphysical gap in the criminal law would be to redouble fidelity to the liberal
conceit, and to recognize a narrowed scope in which criminal law can operate in a deeply
diverse society with satisfying answers to the “why” of its ethical admonitions. To do so
would require that the criminal law stay its hand on matters of deep ethical contestation,
leaving such issues to less violent tools at the disposal of the state, be they other legal
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proscriptions or alternative governmental measures. Of course this alternative would
grate on the prevalent and troubling contemporary political and social instinct to turn
immediately to the criminal law to address all manner of social ills, particularly those
that involve deep normative difference.
We are met with a crucial, if vexing, ethical choice: ontological courage that risks
a form of moral colonialism in a deeply diverse society or modesty in the use of criminal
law that would demand agnosticism on matters of ethical moment.
Paul Kahn begins his study of the political culture of liberalism and its
relationship to the culture of law’s rule with a crucial insight about the central
problematic in contemporary law and politics:
Every age has its own point of access to ethical and political deliberation.
For us, that point is the problem of cultural pluralism. Lacking a
conviction in the absolute truth of our own beliefs and practices, we are
uncertain how to respond to those who live by different norms. We are all
too aware that such differences exist, as we interact with cultures that put
different values on life and death, family and society, religion and the
state, men and women. We constantly confront the question of whether
some of the practices supported by these values are beyond the limits of
our own commitment to a liberal moral philosophy and a political practice
of tolerance. We worry about moral cowardice when we fail to respond
critically, and about cultural imperialism when we do respond.54
Contemporary debates on polygamy show that this conundrum afflicts the criminal law as
it does all parts of our political and legal culture. It is a problem posed and exacerbated
by cultural pluralism; it is also a problem at the structural base of our criminal law. There
is perhaps no question more important to contemporary criminal law than the question of
its justified limits; and yet there is no path through this question that can bypass the
relationship between metaphysics and ethics.
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